Guerrilla_Attack_Civilians

…The call for popular support as a necessary ingredient for success

 

I’ve come to respect and admire Sam Culper’s insight and expertise.  He’s an absolute asset to the American Redoubt movement.  He nails this point home in true Guerrillamerica fashion.  This CANNOT SUCCEED without popular support.  He identifies some tactics and strategies to achieve that goal, and dispels some misconceptions that others have on the same subject.  To summarize the point I walked away from this article with:

“I would rather the people tell us that it’s time instead of trying to tell the people that it’s time.  Popular support is widespread consensus, not a good idea held by a few people.”

Therein lies the battle, and it should influence our strategies for achieving the safe-haven, refuge, and [American] Redoubt that we feel the Lord has given us the vision for and placed on our hearts.

-John Jacob Schmidt

guerrillamerica

 

 

by Sam Culper

Trudging right along in Learning to East Soup with a Knife (Nagl), we’re arriving at Mao’s “unity of spirit” concept between his revolutionary army and the people.

Whether we’re talking about secession, a resistance or guerrilla campaign, or a full-on revolution, amassing popular support is just as important, if not more important, than amassing forces.

One thing the intelligence element should do – always – is keep an eye on the populace.  What are they thinking?  What are they doing?  Are they helping FreeFor more or less, and if less, when did that support begin to diminish?  Being able to judge the opinions of those who surround you is going to be an important task for the Civil Team.

Mao’s “unity of spirit” concept is reflected in his “Three Rules and Eight Remarks”:

Rules.

1. All actions are subject to command.

2. Do not steal from the people.

3. Be neither selfish nor unjust.

Remarks.

1. Replace the door when you leave the house.

2. Roll up the bedding on which you have slept.

3. Be courteous.

4. Be honest in your transactions.

5. Return what you borrow.

6. Replace what you break.

7. Do not bathe in the presence of women.

8. Do not without authority search those you arrest.

Nagl remarks:

This is a new conceptualization of the idea of a “people’s war,” with even more emphasis on the decisive role of an aroused populace fighting against a conventional army weakened by corruption and inefficiency and crippled by the hatred of the local populace.

Nagl makes the observation that the revolutionary government and the guerrilla leaders were able to command from cover of the populace.  If these rules weren’t followed by the majority of his forces, do you think that most of the populace would have supported the revolutionary movement’s tactics?

From an adversarial perspective, if I know that a guerrilla leader, or any member of a guerrilla team, employs immoral (as seen through the eyes of the populace) tactics or continually violates the ethical code of his organization, then I would consider the potential to develop him as a target.  That’s a problem that we can exploit by offering a solution: this guy treats you badly, and we can make him go away.

To facilitate that, we might develop a psychological operation (PSYOP) campaign and target the affected populace with that message.  We might get our ground game on with some human intelligence (HUMINT) collection.

On the flip side, maybe he’s more detrimental to his organization alive than dead.  Maybe he’s forming a rift within the movement that we have to exploit while he’s alive.  If he’s stealing or targeting the populace, then maybe we use PSYOP to pin his actions on other insurgent leaders; point the blame on others and create more dissent.  All these are ‘ifs’, yet this is the train of adversarial thought.

I’ll go ahead and postulate that the willingness to provide cover for revolutionary forces is near equal to how ethically those forces treat the populace.  If the guerrillas are following their moral standard 50% of the time, then maybe only 50% of the populace will offer support.  That has zero basis in observed, empirical data.  It’s just an off the cuff hypothesis.

So understand why you need the populace to support your tactics and behavior, and not just your end goal.  If you fail to achieve popular support then you will achieve failure, plain and simple.

Mao writes of popular support, “There are, of course, many other conditions indispensable to victory but political mobilization is the most fundamental.”  In this case, “political mobilization” is mobilization for political ends — popular support.

Mao characterizes his national liberation campaign as having three distinct phases:

… one of organization, consolidation, and preservation; one of progressive expansion; and the final phase of decisive phase culminating in the destruction of the enemy.” (Nagl)

I have no problem organizing, consolidating, and preserving what I have right now.  We have a region in which Liberty can be fruitful and prosper: the American Redoubt.  Our first goal should  be organizing, consolidating, and preserving what we have!  We consolidate and hold a piece of earth where Liberty will be defended to the death, and where all threats to Liberty will fall under the heel of overwhelming popular support (that we build there).  This is our reserve, if you will, even if we’re defending a smaller geographical region.

The human terrain and physical terrain in the American Redoubt are both second to none in America!  The American Redoubt is just that – a place where we can preserve our way of life because snuffing out Liberty here is a fool’s errand.